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I. INTRODUCTION 
United States immigration law unfairly impacts the lives of 
lesbian and gay couples in committed bi-national relationships and 
is a glaring exception to a growing trend in western democracies 
towards recognition of immigration rights for same-sex bi-national 
couples.  Under federal immigration law, U.S. citizens and legal 
permanent residents do not have the right to sponsor their same-
sex partners for immigration benefits, a right afforded U.S. citizens 
and lawful permanent residents in opposite-sex bi-national 
marriages.  As a result, many bi-national same-sex couples in this 
country face separation or forced exile, having to find a country 
that will recognize their relationship while satisfying its 
immigration requirements.  While some foreign nationals qualify 
for U.S. visas and residency independent of their relationship to a 
U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, the majority have no 
alternative means to immigrate to this country. 
U.S. immigration law and policy towards lesbians and gay 
men has a long, ugly history.  Over time, however, as social, 
political and governmental attitudes changed to be more tolerant 
of gay people, so too did immigration laws.  Gay and lesbian 
foreign nationals are no longer excluded from entering the United 
States and are no longer barred from adjusting their status to lawful 
permanent residents as a result of their sexual orientation.  
Immigration law must again be modified to reflect contemporary 
social, political, governmental, and legal acceptance of alternative 
family arrangements, specifically the relationships of same-sex 
couples.1 
 
 1. Currently, marriages between same-sex couples are recognized 
nationwide in five countries: Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, South Africa and 
Spain.  See infra note 61.  On May 17, 2004, following the 2003 Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts ruling that denying marriage and its protections to same-
sex couples is unconstitutional under the equality and liberty provisions of the 
Massachusetts Constitution, Massachusetts became the first state in the United 
States to allow same-sex couples to marry.  Alan Cooperman & Jonathan Finer, Gay 
Couples Marry in Massachusetts, WASH. POST, May 18, 2004, at A1; see Goodridge v. 
2
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Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003). 
  Civil unions and other forms of legal recognition for same-sex couples, 
which offer most if not all the rights accorded in a civil marriage, exist nationwide 
in Denmark, Norway, Israel (in the form of common law marriage), Sweden, 
Greenland, Hungary, Iceland, France, South Africa, Germany, Portugal, Finland, 
Croatia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Andorra, Slovenia, and 
Switzerland (approved 2005; expected implementation 2007).  See infra notes 61-
65, 74; Establishment and Termination of Cohabitation, HUNGARY.HU, July 30, 2003, 
http://www.magyarorszag.hu/angol/orszaginfo/ugyleiras/csalad/ellettars/kapcs
olatkotese/egyutteles_szabalyai_a.html (description of cohabitation status from 
Hungarian Government Portal website); International Gay and Lesbian Human 
Rights Commission, Croatian Law on Same Sex Civil Unions, 
http://www.iglhrc.org/site/iglhrc/content.php?type=1&id=73 (English 
translation of the Croatian law on civil unions) (last visited Jan. 12, 2006);  Le 
Gouvernement de Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, La loi relative aux effets légaux 
de certains partenariats, http://www.gouvernement.lu/dossiers/justice/ 
partenariat/ (French text of Luxembourg law on registered partnerships available 
from Luxembourg Government website); Buttletí Oficial del Principat d’Andorra 
(BOPA), http://www.bopa.ad/bopa.nsf/b84c2e9d2d34fe50c1256ad9003b8903 
/9559566b4feb8d3dc1256fcd002754ea!OpenDocument (Catalan text of the 
Andorran registered partnership law); Republic of Slovenia National Assembly,  
http://www.dzrs.si/index.php?id=101&type=98&vt=6&sm=k&docid=5025&showdo
c=1&unid=SZ%7CC12563A400338836C12570280058F84F (Slovenian text of 
Slovenia registered partnership law (ZRIPS) passed June 22, 2005); Gay Couples 
Win Partnership Rights, SWISSPOLITICS.ORG, June 5, 2005, http://www.swisspolitics 
.org/en/news/index.php?page =dossier_artikel&story_id=5845155&dossier_id=80 
(reporting on Swiss voter approval of registered partnership law); OUTfront! 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & Transgender Human Rights, International Briefs—
Summer 2005, http://www.amnesty usa.org/outfront/briefs.html (noting that 
Greenland recognizes Denmark’s civil union law). 
  Within the United States, individual states provide for civil unions or 
domestic partnerships between same-sex couples.  Vermont and Connecticut 
currently grant protections to same-sex couples through civil unions. The 
Vermont civil union legislation provides: “Parties to a civil union shall have all the 
same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive 
from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source 
of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.”  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 
1204(a) (2004).  The Connecticut civil union law affords those legally joined in a 
civil union all the same benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law that 
are granted to spouses in marriage in categories such as state and municipal 
taxation, family leave benefits, hospital visitation and notification, state public 
assistance benefits, and court privileges.  2005 Conn. Acts 05-10 (Reg. Sess.).   
  Domestic partnerships are recognized by dozens of cities and a handful of 
states.  Pursuant to the Domestic Partners Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003 
(A.B. 205), as of January 1, 2005, registered domestic partners in California have 
most of the rights and responsibilities given to married spouses under California 
state law.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2005).  On January 12, 2004, the New 
Jersey Governor signed into law the “Domestic Partnership Act.”  The rights 
provided to domestic partners include: the right to make medical or legal 
decisions for an incapacitated domestic partner, the right to consent for an 
autopsy, the right to authorize donation of the deceased partner’s organs, the 
right to be exempt from New Jersey inheritance tax on the same grounds as a 
3
Ayoub and Wong: Separated and Unequal
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
04AYOUB.DOC 1/30/2006  9:41:23 AM 
562 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
Congress has the opportunity to pass the Uniting American 
Families Act; proposed legislation that would afford U.S. citizens 
and legal permanent residents the right to sponsor their same-sex 
partners for immigration benefits.2  The Supreme Court ruling in 
Lawrence v. Texas3 and the recognition of same-sex couples for 
immigration benefits by eighteen countries worldwide make a 
strong legal and moral case for Congress to pass the proposed 
legislation and grant immigration benefits to bi-national same-sex 
 
spouse, the right to be eligible for dependent benefits under the state-
administered retirement system, and the right to domestic partner health benefits 
for state employees.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-2 (2004); see also Domestic Partnership 
Act, 2004 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 246 (West). 
  On April 28, 2004, Maine’s Governor John Baldacci signed the state’s first 
domestic partnership law into effect.  See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2004); 
see also 2004 Me. Legis. Serv. 672 (West).  The law provides a handful of rights to 
domestic partners including the right to intestate succession, the right to elect 
against the will, the right to make funeral and burial arrangements, the right to 
receive victim’s compensation, and preferential status to be named as guardian 
and/or conservator in the event of the death of a domestic partner.  See 2004 Me. 
Legis. Serv. 672. 
  Several other states and individual cities provide more limited benefits 
and protections for domestic partners.  For instance, in 1997, the Hawaii 
legislature passed the Reciprocal Beneficiaries law.  See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
572C-4 (LexisNexis 2004). The Reciprocal Beneficiaries law allows any two single 
adults who are not eligible to marry under state law to have access to 
approximately sixty state-conferred rights, benefits, and responsibilities of 
marriage, including the right to sue for wrongful death, the right to inherit 
intestate, the right to hospital visitation, the right to make medical decisions, and 
some property rights.  See Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, 
Reciprocal Beneficiaries: The Hawaiian Approach, Oct. 23, 2005, http://www. 
buddybuddy.com/d-p-hawa.html.  The District of Columbia has recognized same-
sex partnerships since 2002.  D.C. CODE §§ 32-701 to -710 (2001) (including 
domestic partners as “family members” for the purposes of health care).  All 
couples registered as domestic partners are entitled to the same rights as legal 
family members to visit their domestic partners in hospitals and to make decisions 
concerning the treatment of a domestic partner’s remains after the partner’s 
death.  Id.  The measure also grants rights to a number of benefits to District of 
Columbia government employees.  Id.  Domestic partners are eligible for health 
care insurance policies, can use annual leave or unpaid leave for the birth or 
adoption of a dependent child and/or care for their domestic partner or their 
dependants, and/or arrange for or attend the funeral.  Id. 
  Finally, eleven states—California, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington—and 
the District of Columbia provide domestic partner benefits for the domestic 
partners of state employees.  NCLR Publications, Marriage, Domestic Partnerships, 
and Civil Unions, http://www.nclrights.org/publications/marriage_equality 
0905.htm.  
 2. See infra Part III.B. 
 3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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couples.4  Likewise, providing immigration equality for same-sex 
couples would further U.S. obligations under international law, 
which were implicitly recognized by Lawrence, to protect and 
promote the right to family and family unity. 
II. THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN UNDER 
U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW 
This country’s discriminatory immigration law and policy 
against lesbians and gay men dates back to the Immigration Act of 
1917 when Congress first codified a ban against gay people seeking 
to enter the United States.5  In 1952, the Immigration and 
Nationality Act repealed the 1917 Act, but continued to exclude 
gay people as “afflicted with psychopathic personality . . . or a 
mental defect.”6  This categorization reflected the view that 
homosexuality was a mental illness.7  Countless individuals have 
 
 4. Currently, the immigration laws and policies of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom allow gay and lesbian citizens to sponsor their same-sex partners for 
immigration purposes.  Susan Hazeldean & Heather Betz, Years Behind: What the 
United States Must Learn About Immigration Law and Same-Sex Couples, HUM. RTS. 
MAG. (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summer03/immigration. 
html; American Immigration Lawyers Association, Issue Paper, Permanent 
Partners Act, http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid =8384. 
 5. See 8 U.S.C. § 136 (2000) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39 
Stat. 874, 875, repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act § 403(a)(13), (16), (18), 
66 Stat. 279, 280 (1952)) (excluding those “certified by the examining surgeon as 
mentally or physically defective”). 
 6. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952) 
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2002)).  The 1990 amendment excluded 
“[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation, or a mental 
defect,” and grouped homosexuality with six other medical grounds for exclusion: 
mental retardation; insanity; one or more attacks of insanity; narcotic drug 
addiction or chronic alcoholism; dangerous contagious disease; and physical 
defect, disease, or disability that may affect the ability to earn a living.  8 U.S.C. §§ 
1182(a)(1)-(3), (5)-(7) (1988) (amended 1990). 
 7. Shannon Minter, Note, Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S. 
Immigration Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 771, 777 
(1993) (discussing the political and legal barriers to asylum for homosexuals in 
the United States).  Congress deferred to the medical expertise of the Public 
Health Service (PHS) and abandoned an initial draft of the Act that had 
specifically named “homosexual and sex perverts” an excludable class.  Id.  The 
PHS voiced concern about the difficulty of diagnosing homosexuality and advised 
the legislature to use the more general language of “psychopathic personality or 
mental defect” to make the diagnosis of homosexuals easier.  Id.  Congress 
accepted the recommendation but registered the caveat that “[t]his change of 
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been excluded at the border, deported, or denied naturalization 
under this provision.  Pursuant to statutory procedure under the 
1952 Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Service8 (INS) 
referred any person suspected of homosexuality to a Public Health 
Service9 (PHS) official for an examination.10  The PHS official 
examined the individual, diagnosed the existence of a psychopathic 
personality or other condition, and issued a certificate, 
corresponding to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), to the INS officer.11  The 
certificate constituted the sole evidence for exclusion or 
deportation of the foreign national.12 
The 1952 exclusion operated to ban lesbians and gay men 
from entry into the United States13 until 1963 when the Ninth 
Circuit held that it was void for vagueness.14  Congress responded 
almost immediately to the court’s ruling and, to avoid any 
 
nomenclature is not to be construed in any way as modifying the intent to exclude 
all aliens who are sexual deviates.”  Id.; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC 
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL DISORDERS 38-39 (1952) (listing homosexuality 
as a type of “sociopathic personality disturbance”). 
 8. On November 25, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 into law.  U.S. Citizenship and Immig. Servs., INS to DHS: 
Where is it now?, http://uscis.gov/graphics/othergov/roadmap.htm (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2006).  This law transferred INS functions to the newly enacted 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  Id.  Immigration enforcement 
functions were placed directly within the Directorate of Border and 
Transportation Security (BTS), or indirectly through Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) (including, Border Patrol and INS Inspections) or Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (which includes the enforcement and 
investigation components of INS such as Investigations, Intelligence, Detention 
and Removals).  Id.  As of March 1, 2003, the former INS was abolished and all 
functions and units were incorporated into the new DHS.   Id. 
 9. The Public Health Service is an agency in the Department of Health and 
Human Services, headed by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii).  
PHS doctors are authorized to examine entering aliens at ports of entry and 
overseas.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1224. 
 10. 8 U.S.C. § 1222 (original version at 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1988)) (amended 
1996); Minter, supra note 7, at 778. 
 11. 8 U.S.C. § 1222; Minter, supra note 7, at 778. 
 12. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (stating the immigration judge should decide “based 
solely upon such certification”); Minter, supra note 7, at 778. 
 13. See, e.g., Quiroz v. Neely, 291 F.2d 906, 907 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that 
Congress had intended to exclude homosexuals and that the medical profession’s 
understanding of the term “psychopathic personality” would not control). 
 14. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated on other 
grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963) (“[T]he statutory term ‘psychopathic personality,’ 
when measured by common understanding and practices, does not convey 
sufficiently definite warning that homosexuality and sex perversion are embraced 
therein.”). 
6
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ambiguity about its intention to exclude homosexuals, in 1965 
amended the Act to specifically exclude from entry aliens who were 
afflicted with a “sexual deviation”—i.e., homosexuals.15  However, 
in 1967, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the term 
“psychopathic personality” was unconstitutionally vague.16  In its 
decision, the Court examined the legislative history of the provision 
and found a clear congressional intent to exclude homosexuals.17  
Despite Congress’s deference to medical expertise in drafting the 
provision, the Court held that “psychopathic personality” was a 
legal term of art independent of its clinical meaning in medical 
discourse, and as such, clearly included homosexuality.18 
In 1973 the American Psychiatric Association removed 
homosexuality from its official list of disorders.19  Six years later, in 
1979, the PHS informed the INS that it would no longer certify 
homosexuals as having psychopathic personalities.20  In 1980, the 
Department of Justice reacted by announcing that despite the 
action of the PHS, it continued to have a “legal obligation to 
exclude homosexuals from entering the United States” because 
Congress’s ban on “sexual deviation” was still in effect.21  The 
Department of Justice indicated that it would carry out that 
obligation, however, “solely upon the voluntary admission by the 
alien that he or she was homosexual.”22 
Unsurprisingly, the Justice Department’s new policy was 
challenged and the courts split on the legality of excluding lesbians 
and gay men from entering the United States on the basis of their 
sexual orientation.  In Hill v. INS, the Ninth Circuit ruled that gay 
people could not be excluded from the United States without a 
 
 15. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 
(amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)) (amended again in 1990). 
 16. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 119 (1967). 
 17. Id. at 120. 
 18. Id. at 124. 
 19. Minter, supra note 7, at 779; see also SIMON LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE 222-25 
(1996) (summarizing the history of the APA’s decision to remove homosexuality 
from its list of disorders). 
 20. Memorandum from Julius Richmond, Assistant Sec. for Health, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, and Surgeon Gen. to William Foege and 
George Lythcott (August 2, 1979); see also Minter, supra note 7, at 779. 
 21. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Guidelines and Procedures for the 
Inspection of Aliens who are Suspected of Being Homosexual (Sept. 9, 1980) 
[hereinafter Guidelines and Procedures]; see also Minter, supra note 7, at 779. 
 22. See Guidelines and Procedures, supra note 21. 
7
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certification from the PHS.23  Prior to the court’s decision, the 
medical certificate could no longer be obtained.24  In In re Longstaff, 
the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite result, denying petitioner’s 
naturalization, as he had not been “lawfully admitted” into the 
country because he was homosexual.25 
The Immigration Act of 1990 resolved the conflict among 
the courts and eliminated the exclusionary provision altogether.26  
Under the 1990 Act, lesbians and gay men were no longer 
automatically barred from entering or immigrating to the United 
States.  However, even after the 1990 Act, gay men and lesbians 
were vulnerable to deportation, exclusion, or denial of citizenship 
based on convictions for sodomy or public morality offenses under 
the “crimes involving moral turpitude” or “good moral character” 
exclusions still enshrined in immigration laws.27  Thus, although 
the Immigration Act of 1990 eliminated the rationale for doing so, 
the U.S. government continued to exercise its discretion to use 
sodomy statutes to exclude and deport gay people from the 
country, as well as to deny them citizenship.28  In Lawrence v. Texas, 
 
 23. 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 24. On August 2, 1979, the Surgeon General announced that the PHS would 
no longer issue certificates solely because an alien was suspected of being 
homosexual.  Id. at 1472. 
 25. 716 F.2d 1439, 1440 (5th Cir. 1983).  Longstaff had been admitted to the 
United States eighteen years earlier as a permanent resident.  Id.  In seeking 
citizenship, Longstaff admitted that he had always been a homosexual.  Id. at 1447.  
His admission, had it been made at the time of his initial entry, would have 
sufficed to exclude him even without a medical certificate.  See id. at 1447-50 
(contending that certification is not a prerequisite to barring an applicant’s 
admission and that naturalization can be denied based on the applicant’s 
voluntary admission that he or she is a homosexual). 
 26. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 
5067-78 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1990)).  The “psychopathic 
personality” exclusion was eliminated after years of lobbying by openly gay 
congressperson Barney Frank and others, and came in the wake of the litigation 
outlined above.  Minter, supra note 7, at 771.  The elimination was part of a 
“general reform of the old exclusion laws.”  Id. at 771-72, 780.  Moreover, by this 
time, the “terminology used in the provision was medically obsolete.”  Id. at 780. 
 27. Immigration and Nationality Act (McCarran-Walter Act), ch. 477, § 
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2000)); see id. § 316(a)(3) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1427(a)(3) (2000)); see also Minter, supra note 7, at 772 (explaining that in the 
aftermath of the Immigration Act of 1990, “lesbians and gay men convicted of 
sodomy or of a public morality offense were at risk of exclusion or deportation 
under the ‘crimes involving moral turpitude’ exclusion, and might be denied 
citizenship under the ‘good moral character’ requirement”). 
 28. Minter, supra note 7, at 772-73, 783.  But see Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432 
8
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the United States Supreme Court held a Texas statute criminalizing 
homosexual sodomy unconstitutional, explaining that the 
government can not intervene to make private homosexual 
conduct between consenting adults a crime.29  Since that decision, 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has not proffered 
guidance as to how it will treat individuals with sodomy convictions 
for immigration purposes. 
While lesbians and gay men are no longer statutorily barred 
from entering the United States, immigration laws continue to 
discriminatorily impact them in many ways.30  The discriminatory 
impact of U.S. immigration laws against lesbians and gay men is 
most prevalent in the arena of family immigration.  Foreign 
nationals currently cannot immigrate to the United States based on 
their committed relationship with a U.S. citizen or lawful 
permanent resident of the same sex. 
 
(4th Cir. 1981) (holding private consensual homosexual acts in themselves do not 
make one ineligible for naturalization for lack of “good moral character”). 
 29. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 30. U.S. immigration law disproportionately affects lesbian and gay foreign 
nationals seeking entry into the United States.  Foreign nationals that have 
communicable diseases, such as HIV, are inadmissible or removable from the 
United States.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000) (stating an alien “who is 
determined . . . to have a communicable disease of public health significance, 
which shall include infection with the etiologic agent for acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome” is ineligible for a visa and may not enter the United States).   
Existing waivers to exclusion and relief from removal can be granted to foreign 
nationals if they can demonstrate that their opposite-sex spouse is a U.S. citizen or 
lawful permanent resident.  See id. § 1182 (g)(1)(A)(providing that the Attorney 
General may waive application of subsection (a)(1)(A)(i) to an alien who is the 
spouse of a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, or alien with an immigrant 
visa).  Similar bars to admission also have a disproportionate effect on 
homosexuals, as the applicable waiver provisions do not apply to lesbian and gay 
foreign nationals.  These include the three and ten year bars to admission for 
aliens that were unlawfully present in the United States: (i) for more than six 
months, but less than one year who then departed the United States and 
subsequently sought to re-enter or adjust their status (three year bar), or (ii) for 
one year or more, then departed the United States and subsequently sought to re-
enter or adjust their status (ten year bar).  See id. § 1182 (a)(9)(B)(i).  Waivers to 
the three and ten year bars are not available to lesbians and gay men because they 
require a showing of proof that refusal to admit the foreign national “would result 
in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawful[] resident [of an opposite-sex] spouse 
or parent of such alien.”  Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).  A foreign national does not 
qualify for a waiver based on the extreme hardship suffered by a same-sex partner 
that is a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident. 
9
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III. THE EXCLUSION OF LESBIAN AND GAY BI-NATIONAL COUPLES 
FROM FAMILY-SPONSORED IMMIGRATION TEARS APART AMERICAN 
FAMILIES AND IS CONTRARY TO THE GROWING INTERNATIONAL 
TREND TO RECOGNIZE SAME-SEX COUPLES FOR IMMIGRATION 
PURPOSES 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), U.S. 
citizens and lawful permanent residents may sponsor their spouses 
for immigration purposes.31  The Immigration and Nationality Act 
does not define the term “spouse,” but has historically been 
interpreted to apply only to opposite-sex couples.32  In 1996, 
Congress clarified the meaning of “spouse” under the INA, and all 
federal statutes, to refer only to a person of the opposite sex who is 
a husband or a wife, thereby excluding recognition of same-sex 
spouses. 33  As a consequence, same-sex partners of U.S. citizens and 
permanent residents are not considered “spouses” under 
immigration law and their partners cannot sponsor them based on 
their relationship for family-based immigration.34  Current 
immigration law forces many bi-national couples to separate, 
relocate to another country, and/or live apart, maintaining 
expensive and emotionally challenging long distance 
relationships.35   
 
 31. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 66 Stat. 163 
(1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000)); id. § 203(a)(2) (codified 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1553(a)(2) (2000)). 
 32. In March 2003, William Yates of the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), issued a 
memorandum instructing DHS officials about various aspects of marriage under 
U.S. immigration law.  Cyrus D. Mehta, Gay Marriage and Immigration, Mar. 15, 
2004, available at http://cyrusmehta.com/news_cyrus.asp?news_id=964&intPage 
=10.  One small section of that memorandum addresses the issue of marriages 
between same-sex couples and refers to the Defense of Marriage Act.  Id.  Yates 
instructed that for a relationship to qualify as marriage for purposes of federal law, 
including under the Immigration and Nationality Act, one partner must be a man 
and the other a woman in a marriage.  Id.  In 1982, the Ninth Circuit considered 
whether a citizen’s spouse must be of the opposite sex in order to fall within the 
meaning of “spouse” under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) and whether such a requirement would be constitutional.  Adams v. 
Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 1982).  The court held that section 
201(b) of the INA categorically excluded same-sex partners from its definition of 
“spouse.”  See id. at 1041 (holding Congress’s intent under the INA was that “only 
partners in heterosexual marriages [can] be considered spouses under section 
201(b)”).  The decision was based, in part, on the court’s reasoning that Congress 
could not have intended to include same-sex partners under the term “spouses” 
because the INA also mandated the exclusion of homosexuals.  Id. at 1040-41.  
The court also reasoned that it was adopting the “ordinary, contemporary, 
10
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Proposed U.S. legislation, the Uniting American Families 
Act (UAFA), recognizes the right to family and family unity by 
granting bi-national same-sex couples immigration benefits.36  The 
UAFA would promote and protect the international right to family 
unity for all families, and align the United States with eighteen 
other countries that already recognize same-sex couples for 
purposes of immigration.37 
A. The Defense of Marriage Act: The Legal Basis for Excluding Lesbian 
and Gay Bi-National Couples from Family-Sponsored Immigration Benefits 
 The federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) clarified the 
meaning of “spouse” under the Immigration and Nationality Act.38  
Signed into law in 1996 by President Bill Clinton, DOMA creates a 
federal definition of marriage to be applied in connection with all 
federal statutes and programs.39  The federal definition of marriage 
is the “legal union between one man and one woman as husband 
and wife.”40  DOMA further clarifies that, for federal purposes, the 
“word spouse refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
 
common meaning” of “spouse,” which at the time did not include spouses of the 
same sex.  Id. at 1040.  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that the exclusion of 
gay or lesbian spouses was constitutionally permissible.  Id. at 1043.  In 
determining the constitutionality of the prohibition, the court noted its limited 
power of judicial review over immigration procedures, stating that for immigration 
purposes, “Congress has almost plenary power and may enact statutes which, if 
applied to citizens, would be unconstitutional.”  Id. at 1042. 
 33. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)); id. § 2(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C 
(2000)). 
 34. Id. § 3(a) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7); id. § 2(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
1738C). 
 35. A preliminary study of the 2000 census by demographer Gary Gates of the 
Williams Project on gay studies at the UCLA School of Law, found that in six 
percent of the 594,391 same-sex unmarried couples, one of the partners is a 
citizen and one is a noncitizen; that would indicate more than 35,000 same-sex bi-
national couples living in the United States at the time of the census.  GARY J. 
GATES, BI-NATIONAL SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNERS IN CENSUS 2000:A 
DEMOGRAPHIC PORTRAIT 1 (2005), http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsproj/ 
publications/Binational_Report.pdf. 
 36. Uniting American Families Act, H.R. 3006, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 37. Those eighteen countries are: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom.  See infra notes 61-76; see also GATES, supra note 35, at 2. 
 38. This publication will not address the legality of DOMA. 
 39. Defense of Marriage Act § 3 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)). 
 40. Id. 
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husband or a wife.”41  The effect of such language is to exclude all 
same-sex couples from having a federally recognized marriage.  
Under DOMA, this definition applies to any federal law or 
regulation as well as to any interpretation of the various 
administrative bureaus and agencies of the federal government.42 
By itself, DOMA precludes recognizing any spousal rights or 
benefits, including immigration, for same-sex couples.  Therefore, 
unlike heterosexual spouses, lesbian and gay foreign nationals 
cannot immigrate to the United States based on their relationship 
with a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident of the same sex.  
Only opposite-sex married persons may sponsor their foreign 
national spouses for permanent resident status.43 
The immigration restriction against bi-national same-sex 
partners remains true for bi-national same-sex couples whose 
marriage is legally recognized by the state or foreign country in 
which they wed.  Because U.S. immigration benefits are federal 
rights, only the federal government can confer legalization onto a 
foreign national.  Under DOMA, marriages, civil unions, and 
domestic partnerships recognized by states confer no immigration 
benefits to bi-national same-sex couples.44  Therefore, even though 
marriages between same-sex couples are being legally performed in 
other countries, as well as in the State of Massachusetts, such 
recognition does not impact the current federal immigration law 
and policy precluding lesbian and gay U.S. citizens or lawful 
permanent residents from sponsoring their foreign national 
partners for immigration benefits. 
To date, DOMA has not been successfully challenged in the 
context of immigration benefits or otherwise.45  Challenging the 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Mehta, supra note 32 (discussing the Yates memo). 
 44. See Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2419 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 1738C (2000) and 1 U.S.C. 7 
(2000)). 
 45. See, e.g., Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 870, 880 (C.D. 
Cal. 2005) (Finding section 3 of DOMA constitutional under the Due Process 
Clause because the fundamental right to marriage does not include marriages 
between two people of the same sex, and constitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause because the government’s interest in promoting procreation or 
“stable relationships that facilitate rearing children” passes a rational basis test); 
Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding DOMA 
constitutional and dismissing complaint seeking declaratory judgment and 
injunction against its enforcement); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 140-41 (Bankr. 
12
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immigration treatment of same-sex couples in court is not currently 
sanctioned by scholars and public interest groups.  DOMA’s virtual 
insulation of marriage between same-sex couples and any related 
federal benefits, as well as the Supreme Court’s required deference 
to Congress, makes litigation in immigration a disfavored option 
for challenging the issue.  Further, a negative decision at this point 
would create a blockade for same-sex bi-national couples’ 
immigration efforts.  A court challenge to DOMA is not the only 
avenue for changing the treatment of bi-national same-sex couples 
under immigration law.  Currently, the best way to achieve 
immigration equality for bi-national same-sex couples is to further 
develop the ideas of family rights and unity for all U.S. citizens and 
lawful residents while advocating for legislation that recognizes and 
supports such rights. 
B. The Uniting American Families Act Would Provide Same-Sex Bi-
National Couples with Equal Immigration Rights to Opposite Sex Bi-
National Couples 
The Uniting American Families Act (formerly Permanent 
Partners Immigration Act (PPIA)) is a bill currently before 
Congress that provides same-sex couples with the same 
immigration benefits as opposite-sex couples.46  Specifically, the 
UAFA would grant U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents the 
right to sponsor their same-sex permanent partners to immigrate to 
the United States.47  This legislation would ease the current 
immigration inequality and injustice endured by thousands of bi-
national same-sex couples by granting immigration rights and 
benefits to same-sex couples.  It would not alter the federal 
definition of spouse or provide same-sex couples with the federal 
 
W.D. Wash. 2004) (finding DOMA constitutional and dismissing debtors’—two 
women married in British Columbia, Canada—joint petition in bankruptcy); see 
also Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing DOMA 
and equivalent Florida law that homosexuals cannot marry and are thus relevantly 
dissimilar to nonmarried heterosexuals for the purposes of a rational basis test as 
applied to a Florida statute prohibiting adoption of children by homosexuals), 
aff’d sub nom. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 
(11th Cir. 2004), reh’g denied 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 46. Uniting American Families Act, S. 1278, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3006, 
109th Cong. (2005). 
 47. Uniting American Families Act, S. 1278, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3006, 
109th Cong. (2005). 
13
Ayoub and Wong: Separated and Unequal
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
04AYOUB.DOC 1/30/2006  9:41:23 AM 
572 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
rights and responsibilities of marriage.48  While the UAFA does not 
cure the effects and reach of the Defense of Marriage Act, it will 
advance family unity and end the forced separation and constant 
fear of deportation faced by thousands of lesbian and gay couples 
in the United States. 
Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) first introduced this 
bill, then known as the Permanent Partners Immigration Act, to 
Congress in 2001.49  In July 2003, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) 
introduced the Senate companion bill for the first time.50  By the 
end of the 108th Congress, the PPIA had garnered 129 co-sponsors 
in the House and 12 co-sponsors in the Senate.51  On June 21, 2005, 
the bill was re-introduced in both chambers of Congress under the 
new name, the Uniting American Families Act.52  If passed, the 
UAFA would allow U.S. citizens and permanent residents to file a 
visa petition on behalf of their foreign national same-sex 
permanent partners, allowing them to immigrate to the U.S. and 
adjust their status to become lawful permanent residents.53  The bill 
defines “permanent partner” as any person eighteen years of age or 
older who is: 
(i) in a committed, intimate relationship with 
an adult U.S. citizen or legal permanent 
resident eighteen years of age or older in 
which both parties intend a lifelong 
commitment; 
 
 48. See Uniting American Families Act, S. 1278, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 
3006, 109th Cong. (2005) (inserting “permanent partners” after the term 
“spouses” at many points throughout the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
 49. Bill Summary and Status, H.R. 690, 107th Cong. (2001), 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR00690:@@@L&summ2=m&. 
 50. Bill Summary and Status, S. 1510, 108th Cong. (2003), 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN01510:@@@L&summ2=m&. 
 51. Id.; Bill Summary and Status, H.R. 832, 108th Cong. (2003), 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00832:@@@L&summ2=m&. 
 52. Bill Summary and Status, S. 1278, 109th Cong. (2005), 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.01278:; Bill Summary and 
Status, H.R. 3006, 109th Cong. (2005), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.03006:. 
 53. See S. 1278, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005), which would amend 8 U.S.C. § 
1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000) to include “permanent partners” as “immediate relatives” 
of U.S. citizens not subject to numerical limitations or worldwide limitations, thus 
allowing U.S. citizens to file a petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (a)(1)(A)(i)).  See also 
id. § 5 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) to give “permanent partners” and spouses of 
permanent residents the same preference allocation, allowing permanent 
residents to file a petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (a)(1)(B)(i)). 
14
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(ii) financially interdependent with that other 
person; 
(iii) not married to, or in a permanent 
partnership with, anyone other than that 
other person; 
(iv) unable to contract with that person a 
marriage cognizable under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act; and 
(v) is not a first, second, or third degree blood 
relation of that other individual.54 
The permanent partners could prove that they have a bona 
fide relationship through documentary and testimonial evidence.  
The sponsoring “permanent partner” would also have to commit to 
providing financial support before the other partner could obtain 
immigration benefits based on their relationship.55 
These requirements ensure that the UAFA protects same-
sex couples in committed relationships while preventing fraudulent 
immigration applications.  Indeed, the applicable burden of proof 
standard would be identical to that which currently applies to all 
heterosexual married couples seeking immigration benefits.  
Moreover, just like heterosexual couples, permanent partners 
would be subject to severe criminal penalties for immigration fraud 
or other abuse in connection with the application for permanent 
residence. 56  Because the Act’s intent is to remedy the unequal 
treatment of same-sex partners, it would not affect unmarried 
heterosexual couples, who currently have the option to marry and 
seek relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act.57 
The UAFA is analogous to immigration equality legislation 
and policy adopted by Australia and Israel.58  It does not alter or 
redefine the federal definition of marriage for immigration 
purposes or otherwise.  Nor does it provide additional legal rights 
and responsibilities comparable to those afforded through 
marriage.  Instead, it simply provides U.S. citizens and lawful 
permanent residents with the right to petition for their foreign 
 
 54. S. 1278, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005). 
 55. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii), 
1183a(f). 
 56. See, e.g., S. 1278 § 18 (amending 8 U.S.C. 1325(c) to include permanent 
partners in the marriage fraud provision). 
 57. See id. § 2(51)(D). 
 58. See infra Part III.C and note 65. 
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national permanent partners to immigrate to the United States, a 
right provided heterosexual bi-national couples.  The right to 
petition for one’s foreign national permanent partner would 
provide for family unity and strengthen familial bonds.  Partners 
unable to reside together are forced to separate, relocate to 
another country, and/or maintain expensive and emotionally 
challenging long distance relationships.  As recognized by Lawrence, 
lesbians and gay men have the right to form and sustain loving 
personal relationships.59  Geographical unity is an essential element 
to sustain such relationships. 
At the time of this publication, ten Senate members and 
ninety-one Representatives co-sponsor the bill.60 
 
 59. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 60. Sen. Boxer, Barbara (CA); Sen. Chafee, Lincoln (RI); Sen. Corzine, Jon S. 
(NJ); Sen. Dayton, Mark (MN); Sen. Feingold, Russell D. (WI); Sen. Jeffords, 
James M. (VT); Sen. Kennedy, Edward M. (MA); Sen. Kerry, John F. (MA); Sen. 
Lautenberg, Frank R. (NJ); Sen. Murray, Patty (WA); Rep. Abercrombie, Neil (HI-
1); Rep. Allen, Thomas H. (ME-1); Rep. Andrews, Robert E. (NJ-1); Rep. Baird, 
Brian(WA-3); Rep. Baldwin, Tammy (WI-2); Rep. Berkley, Shelley (NV-1); Rep. 
Berman, Howard L. (CA-28); Rep. Blumenauer, Earl (OR-3); Rep. Brown, 
Corrine(FL-3); Rep. Brown, Sherrod (OH-13); Rep. Capps, Lois (CA-23); Rep. 
Capuano, Michael E. (MA-8); Rep. Clay, William Lacy (MO-1); Rep. Crowley, 
Joseph (NY-7); Rep. Davis, Susan A. (CA-53); Rep. DeGette, Diana (CO-1); Rep. 
Delahunt, William D. (MA-10); Rep. DeLauro, Rosa L. (CT-3); Rep. Emanuel, 
Rahm (IL-5); Rep. Engel, Eliot L. (NY-17); Rep. Eshoo, Anna G.(CA-14); Rep. 
Farr, Sam (CA-17); Rep. Fattah, Chaka (PA-2); Rep. Filner, Bob (CA-51); Rep. 
Frank, Barney (MA-4); Rep. Gonzalez, Charles A. (TX-20); Rep. Grijalva, Raul M. 
(AZ-7); Rep. Gutierrez, Luis V. (IL-4); Rep. Harman, Jane (CA-36); Rep. Hastings, 
Alcee L. (FL-23); Rep. Hinchey, Maurice D. (NY-22); Rep. Holt, Rush D. (NJ-12); 
Rep. Honda, Michael M. (CA-15); Rep. Hoyer, Steny H. (MD-5); Rep. Inslee, Jay 
(WA-1); Rep. Jackson, Jesse L., Jr. (IL-2); Rep. Jones, Stephanie Tubbs (OH-11); 
Rep. Kennedy, Patrick J. (RI-1); Rep. Kolbe, Jim (AZ-8); Rep. Kucinich, Dennis J. 
(OH-10); Rep. Langevin, James R. (RI-2); Rep. Lantos, Tom (CA-12); Rep. Larson, 
John B. (CT-1); Rep. Lee, Barbara (CA-9); Rep. Levin, Sander M. (MI-12); Rep. 
Lewis, John (GA-5); Rep. Lofgren, Zoe (CA-16); Rep. Lowey, Nita M. (NY-18); 
Rep. Markey, Edward J. (MA-7); Rep. Matusi, Doris O. (CA-5); Rep. McCarthy, 
Carolyn (NY-4); Rep. McCollum, Betty (MN-4); Rep. McDermott, Jim (WA-7); 
Rep. McNulty, Michael R. (NY-21); Rep. Meek, Kendrick B. (FL-17); Rep. 
Menendez, Robert (NJ-13); Rep. Michaud, Michael H. (ME-2); Rep. Miller, Brad 
(NC-13); Rep. Miller, George (CA-7); Rep. Moore, Dennis (KS-3); Rep. Moore, 
Gwen (WI-4); Rep. Moran, James P. (VA-8); Rep. Napolitano, Grace F. (CA-38); 
Rep. Neal, Richard E. (MA-2); Rep. Olver, John W. (MA-1); Rep. Owens, Major R. 
(NY-11); Rep. Pallone, Frank, Jr. (NJ-6); Rep. Pastor, Ed (AZ-4); Rep. Payne, 
Donald M. (NJ-10); Rep. Pelosi, Nancy (CA-8); Rep. Rangel, Charles B. (NY-15); 
Rep. Rothman, Steven R. (NJ-9); Rep. Sabo, Martin Olav (MN-5); Rep. Sanchez, 
Linda T. (CA-39); Rep. Sanders, Bernard (VT); Rep. Schakowsky, Janice D. (IL-9); 
Rep. Schiff, Adam B. (CA-29); Rep. Serrano, José E. (NY-16); Rep. Sherman, Brad 
(CA-27); Rep. Simmons, Rob (CT-2); Rep. Smith, Adam (WA-9); Rep. Solis, Hilda 
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C. The United States Should Heed Legislation of Eighteen Countries 
World-Wide that Have Granted Immigration Equality 
Currently eighteen countries around the world recognize 
same-sex couples for immigration purposes, generally through 
marriages, registered domestic partnerships, or civil unions.61  The 
U.S. government’s failure to provide same-sex bi-national couples 
with equal access to immigration rights provided opposite-sex 
couples is contrary to the growing acknowledgment of same-sex 
relationships reflected in western democracies’ immigration laws 
and policy.  The absence of immigration equality undercuts family 
security and democratic ideals endorsed by U.S. politic. 
Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Spain 
recognize marriages between same-sex partners and thereby 
provide immigration rights and benefits to bi-national same-sex 
spouses.62  Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the 
 
L. (CA-32); Rep. Stark, Fortney Pete (CA-13); Rep. Tierney, John F. (MA-6); Rep. 
Wasserman Schultz, Debbie (FL-20); Rep. Watson, Diane E. (CA-33); Rep. 
Waxman, Henry A. (CA-30); Rep. Weiner, Anthony D. (NY-9); Rep. Wexler, 
Robert (FL-19); Rep. Woolsey, Lynn C. (CA-6); Rep. Wu, David (OR-1).  See 
Immigration Equality, Information on Current Co-Sponsors, 
http://www.immigrationequality.org/template.php?pageid=152 (listing current 
co-sponsors of UAFA) (last visited Jan. 6, 2006). 
 61. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, and theUnited Kingdom have reformed their immigration policies 
and/or enacted additional legislation to allow gay and lesbian citizens to sponsor 
their same-sex partners for immigration purposes.  See Partners Task Force for Gay 
& Lesbian Couples, Immigration Roundup: A Survey of Welcoming Countries, Aug. 16, 
2005, http://www.eskimo.com/~demian/immigr.html; infra notes 62-76. 
 62. Belgium offers legal marriage for same-sex couples.  Partners Task Force 
for Gay & Lesbian Couples, supra note 61.  “Originally, it was offered only if they 
are both Belgium citizens, or come from a country that allows legal marriage.”  Id.  
The text of the Belgian law opening civil marriage to same-sex couples is available 
in Flemish and French.  See Projet de Loi Ouvrant le Mariage à des Personnes de 
Même Sexe et Modifiant Certaines Dispositions du Code Civil [Law Project 
Opening Marriage to Same-Sex Persons and Modifying Certain Provisions of the 
Civil Code], Doc. 50 2165/ (2002/2003) (2003), http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB 
/pdf/50/2165/50K2165003. pdf. 
  Canada initially permitted foreign same-sex partners to apply for 
residency under the humanitarian and compassionate grounds exception, but now 
simply includes same-sex couples in its “family” immigration category.  See 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Family Class Immigration, 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/sponsor/index.html (last updated Sept. 27, 2005). 
  The foreign partner of a Dutch National, or of an EU citizen resident in 
the Netherlands, or of a foreign national granted refugee status in the 
Netherlands, may settle in the Netherlands.  Dutch Ministry of Justice, IND 
17
Ayoub and Wong: Separated and Unequal
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
04AYOUB.DOC 1/30/2006  9:41:23 AM 
576 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
United Kingdom have all passed legislation allowing same-sex 
couples to become registered partners and/or enter into civil 
unions, enjoying most of the rights and benefits of marriage, 
including immigration benefits.63  France, Germany, and Portugal 
 
Residence Wizard, http://www.ind.nl/EN/verblijfwijzer/ (last visited on Dec. 5, 
2005) (offering information for those who wish to enter the Netherlands). 
  In December 2005, in the case of Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa ruled unanimously that it was 
unconstitutional to prevent people of the same gender marrying when marriage 
was permitted for people of opposite genders.  CCT 60/04, available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/glrts/mhafourie120105.pdf.  The court held 
that the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, insofar as it did not allow marriage between 
same-sex partners, was inconsistent with the constitution, but suspended the 
declaration of its invalidity for twelve months from the date of judgment so as “to 
allow Parliament to correct the defects.”  Id.  The court further held that should 
Parliament not correct the defects by then, the Marriage Act would then be read 
so as to allow same-sex partners to marry.  Id.  Since 1999, following a national 
court ruling that addressed the issue of immigration equality, South Africa has 
provided citizens with the right to sponsor their same-sex partners for immigration 
benefits.  Hazeldean & Betz, supra note 4, at 18.  The South African decision 
unanimously held that failing to treat same-sex life partners equally was a violation 
of the South African Constitution’s equality clause.  Id.; see also Nat’l Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) at 69 
(S. Afr.).  “Previously, the South African government granted immigration benefits 
only in heterosexual marriage relationships.”  Hazeldean & Betz, supra note 4, at 
18. 
  Spain recognized marriages between same-sex couples in a law that took 
effect on July 3, 2005.  See Daniel Woolis, Spain’s Gay Marriage Law Goes into Effect, 
365GAY.COM, July 2, 2005, http://www.365gay.com/newscon05/07/070205 
spain.htm.  Since then, one court in Catalonia has denied a bi-national couple 
(one Spanish partner, one Indian partner) a marriage license based on an article 
in the Spanish civil code that foreign nationals seeking to marry must follow the 
laws of their country of citizenship.  Daniel Woolis, Spain’s Gay Marriage Law Hits 
Snag Over Foreigners, 365GAY.COM, July 6, 2005, http://www.365gay.com 
/newscon05/07/0706705 spain.htm.  However, other bi-national couples have 
successfully wed in Spain and received the attendant immigration rights granted to 
married couples.  See Tito Drago, Matrimonio gay se internacionaliza [Gay Marriage is 
Internationalized], INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY (2005), 
http://www.ipsnoticias. net/nota.asp?idnews=34585.  Finally, on the week before 
August 10, 2005, Spain’s justice ministry overturned the unfavorable ruling in 
Catalonia, and ruled that there are no such restrictions on marriages between 
same-sex bi-national couples in Spain.  See Spain Opens Door to Foreign Gay Marriages, 
365GAY.COM, Aug. 10, 2005, http://www.365gay.com/newscon05/08/081005 
spain.htm.  Information about applying for a Visa de Reagrupación Familiar or 
Schengen visa (for family reunification) is available at the Spanish Consulate.  See, 
e.g., Consulate General of Spain in New York, Residence Visa to Reunite a Family 
with a Spaniard or a Citizen of the European Union, http://www.spain 
consulny.org/%21consula.doi/!reagrupsp.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). 
 63. Denmark’s domestic partnership law of 1989, amended in 1999, provides 
registered partners all the rights associated with marriage, including immigration, 
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where one of the partners is Danish.  “Foreign nationals can obtain a residence 
permit in Denmark if they have a spouse, cohabiting companion or registered 
partner already resident in Denmark.”  See Danish Immigration Service, Spouses 
and Cohabitating Companions, http://www.udlst.dk/english/Family+ 
Reunification/Spouses/Default.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2005); see also Danish 
Immigration Service, Legislation and Conventions, http://www.udlst.dk/english/ 
Legislation/Default.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2005) (displaying links to an English 
translation of the Aliens Act). 
  In Finland, “[p]ersons of the same sex who have registered their 
partnership are considered spouses” for purposes of immigration.  Finland 
Directorate of Immigration, Family Members of Finnish Citizens and Others than 
EU Citizens and Equivalent Persons, http://www.uvi.fi/netcomm/content. 
asp?path= 8,2472,2491&language=EN (last visited Dec. 6, 2005).  “A cohabitant 
can be granted a residence permit if the cohabitants have lived together for at 
least two years and can prove the cohabitation by presenting a lease agreement or 
other documentation or if the cohabitants have joint custody of a child, it is not 
required that the spouses have lived together for two years.”  Id. 
  Under Iceland’s Registered Partnership Law 1996, bi-national lesbian and 
gay couples have the same rights of residence as bi-national married couples, 
where one is an Icelandic national.  See Icelandic Directorate of Immigration, E – 
Residence Permit for Family Members, http://www.utl.is/index.php?bId=202 (last 
visited Dec. 6, 2005). 
  Under Norway’s Registered Partnership Law, bi-national lesbian and gay 
couples have the same rights of residence as bi-national married couples when one 
is a Norwegian national.  See Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, Family 
Reunification, http://www.udi.no/templates/Page.aspx?id=4665 (last visited Jan. 
12, 2006). 
  In 1972, the Swedish Immigration Board adopted the same rules for 
same-sex partners as for heterosexual domestic partners in cases where applicants 
referred to family connection as a reason for immigrating to Sweden.  SWEDISH 
MIGRATION BOARD, FACTS ABOUT RESIDENCE PERMIT ON THE GROUNDS OF FAMILY TIES 
(2005), http://www.migrationsverket.se/infomaterial/bob/sokande/familj/utfam 
_en.pdf.  The first actual residence permit to be granted under this decision came 
in the mid-1970s.  Id.  Bi-national couples in a Registered Partnership enjoy the 
same treatment as opposite-sex married couples when one partner is a Swedish 
national.  Id.  Sweden’s 1995 partnership law gives registered partners the same 
legal rights as heterosexual marriages.  Id. 
  The United Kingdom’s Civil Partnership Act, which came into effect on 
December 5, 2005, “affords same-sex couples almost all the same benefits as 
heterosexual married couples.”  Civil Unions begin in UK, WORKPERMIT.COM, Dec. 
16, 2005, http://www.ukimmigration.com/news/2005_12_16/uk/civil_unions_ 
begin.htm.  The legal status allows recognition of same-sex partners for 
immigration and nationality purposes.  Id.  “Civil partners gain rights to survivor 
pensions[,] hospital visitation, and equal treatment for tax purposes.  They will be 
exempt, as married couples are, from testifying against each other in court.  They 
will also be deemed stepparents of each others’ children, and able to formally 
adopt.”  Id.  Prior to the Civil Partnership Act, a same-sex partner of a British 
citizen, European Union national or permanent resident of the U.K. could be 
granted permission to remain in the U.K.  Immigration Rules, pt. 8, § 1, ¶ 295A 
(U.K.), available at http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/ 
lawspolicy/immigration_rules/part_8/part_9.html. 
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have created alternative partnership schemes which provide a 
limited number of legal rights to same-sex partners, including the 
right to petition one’s same-sex partner for immigration benefits.64  
Australia and Israel have reformed their immigration policies to 
recognize same-sex couples without granting the right to marry or 
creating an alternative partnership scheme.65 
Brazil provided citizens with the right to sponsor their same-
sex partners for immigration benefits following national court 
 
 64. “France grants gay and lesbian couples immigration rights through a less 
comprehensive partnership scheme called the Pacte Civil de Solidarite (PACS).  
The PACS is open to opposite-sex couples as well as same-sex couples and is not 
intended to be parallel to marriage; it does not change a person’s civil status from 
single to married, nor is a formal proceeding similar to a divorce required to 
terminate the relationship. It does, however, confer immigration rights.”  
Hazeldean & Betz, supra note 4, at 17. 
  “Germany passed a Registered Life Partnership Law in November 2000, 
[creating Lebenspartnerschaft, or “Life Partnership,”] which grants participating 
same-sex couples a limited number of legal rights including inheritance, tenancy, 
and immigration.”  Id. at 17-18.  Prior to the passage of Germany’s partnership 
scheme, a number of same-sex couples managed to obtain residence permits for 
the foreign partner by invoking the ruling of the Higher Administrative Court in 
Munster.  See generally Stephen Ross Levitt, New Legislation in Germany Concerning 
Same-Sex Unions, 7 ILSA J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 469 (2001) (providing an extensive 
description of Germany’s history of same-sex legislation and recent legislative 
developments).  The Munster court, which has sole jurisdiction in Germany in 
appeals regarding visa matters, ruled that the European Convention on Human 
Rights implied a right for the foreign partner of a bi-national same-sex couple in a 
lasting relationship to be granted a residence permit.  Id.  The German Foreign 
Ministry appealed this ruling but then allowed the time-limit for the written 
submission of the appeal to expire so that the ruling became legally valid.  Id.  
Before the Registered Life Partnership Law became enacted, each region 
individually dealt with the issue of same-sex partner immigration.  Id. 
  “Portugal passed a . . . statute in March 2001, creating an institution 
called a registered union that grants same-sex couples a limited number of rights, 
including the ability to sponsor a foreign partner for immigration.”  Hazeldean & 
Betz, supra note 4, at 18. 
 65. In Australia, same-sex partners of Australian citizens, permanent 
residents, or eligible New Zealand citizens gain permanent residence to Australia 
under the Interdependency class of available relationships. See Australian Gov’t, 
Dep’t of Immigr. & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Fact Sheet 30: Family 
Stream Migration—Partners, http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/30partners.htm (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2006). 
  Since 1994, in the form of common law marriage, Israel has granted 
unregistered cohabitation for same-sex couples.  Civil Unions in Israel, WIKIPEDIA, 
THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_unions_in_Israel (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2006).  Prior to 1994, common law marriage was only extended to 
heterosexual couples.  Id.  Following lawsuits in 1994-1996, same-sex couples enjoy 
several benefits.  Id.   
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rulings that addressed the issue of immigration equality.66  In 2003, 
a Brazilian court held that same-sex unions entered into abroad 
must be recognized for purposes of immigration in Brazil.67  This 
ruling enables bi-national couples who enter into marriage, a civil 
union, or domestic partnership, to utilize Brazilian immigration 
procedures associated with sponsoring a spouse.68  Although slow to 
implement national adherence to the decision, the Brazilian 
government eventually “dispose[d] of the criteria for the 
concession of temporary or permanent visa, or of definitive 
permanence to the male or female partner, without distinction of 
sex.”69  The Brazilian National Council on Immigration currently 
recognizes same-sex bi-national couples for immigration purposes.70 
Since March 29, 1999, New Zealand’s immigration law has 
allowed for same-sex partners of New Zealand citizens or residents 
to apply for residence in New Zealand in the same manner as 
different-sex spouses or partners.71  Prior to this alignment, same-
sex couples were able to immigrate although serious constraints 
applied against them that were not applicable to similarly situated 
heterosexual couples.72  For instance, “same sex couples ha[d] to 
 
 66. Hazeldean & Betz, supra note 4, at 18. 
 67. Press Release, Immigration Equality, Brazil Clarifies its Same-Sex 
Immigration Policy (May 11, 2005), http://www.lgirtf.org/uploadedfiles/Brazil 
clarifies same-sex immigration policy.pdf [hereinafter Brazil 2005 Press Release]; 
see also Press Release, Love Sees No Borders, Brazil Beats U.S. in Providing 
Immigration Equality to Same-Sex Couples (Dec. 18, 2003), 
http://www.loveseesnoborders.org/Rel_121803.html. 
 68. Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, Immigration Roundup: A 
Survey of Welcoming Countries, Aug. 16, 2005, http://www.eskimo.com/~demian 
/immigr.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006). 
 69. Press Release, Brazilian Rainbow Group, Brazil Clarifies Its Same-Sex 
Immigration Policy, (May 11, 2004), http://www.brgny.org/Press.html (quoting 
Brazil’s National Immigration Council’s Administrative Resolution Number 3 of 
December 3, 2003); Brazil 2005 Press Release, supra note 67. 
 70. Brazil 2005 Press Release, supra note 67; Love Sees No Borders, supra note 
67. 
 71. Hazeldean & Betz, supra note 4 at 18.  In 2004, New Zealand passed a civil 
union law that took effect in April 2005; the immigration laws applicable to bi-
national same-sex couples are unaffected by the civil union law.  See Internal Affairs 
Prepares for Civil Unions, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Dec. 10, 2004, available at 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/ story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=9002623; see also 
The New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, Services, Civil Union, 
http://www.bdm.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Services-Births-Deaths-and-
Marriages-Civil-Union?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 16, 2006) (describing the 
Civil Union Act 2004). 
 72. Media Statement, Hon Tuariki John Delamere, N.Z. Minister of 
Immigration, Immigration, Discrimination and Same-Sex de Facto Couples (Dec. 
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show their relationship [was] at least of four years duration before 
it [would be] recognized [sic] for the purposes of residence 
eligibility, whereas de facto heterosexual couples ha[d] to show 
they’ve been together for only two years.”73  In expanding its 
immigration law and policy to include same-sex couples, the New 
Zealand government relied upon the New Zealand Human Rights 
Act of 1993 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.74  Moreover, since 2001, “partners of student or work 
visa or permit holders may be issued with temporary visas or 
granted temporary permits of a type appropriate to their needs for 
the currency of their partner’s visa or permit.”75   
On February 11, 2003, [the European Parliament of the 
European Union] approved a directive guaranteeing 
same-sex couples freedom of movement among member 
states equal to that of married heterosexual couples, 
where those same-sex relationships are recognized.  
Justification for the legislation was unambiguous: the 
European Union declared it must “reflect and respect the 
diversity of family relationships that exist in today’s 
society” by including same-sex couples.76 
All eighteen countries have adopted varying legal bases for 
recognizing bi-national same-sex couples for immigration purposes. 
Behind each approach, however, is the inherent recognition by 
these countries’ politic that such legislation and policy furthers the 
right to family and the importance of family unity, regardless of 
sexual orientation.  Absence of similar U.S. legislation abrogates 
our obligation under international law to promote and protect 
 
22, 1998), available at http://www.gaylawnet.com/news/1998/im98.htm. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.; see also Immigration New Zealand, Partner, http://www.immigration. 
govt.nz/migrant/stream/live/partner/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) (offering 
information regarding immigration policies in New Zealand); NEW ZEALAND 
IMMIGRATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS MANUAL § F3.10 (2001) (setting out evidentiary 
requirements for living in a “genuine and stable” relationship), available at 
http://www.immigration.govt.nz/nzis/operations_manual/5538.htm (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2005). 
 75. Compare NEW ZEALAND IMMIGRATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS MANUAL § E4.5a 
(2001), available at http://www.immigration.govt.nz/nzis/operations 
manual/5089.htm, with NEW ZEALAND IMMIGRATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS MANUAL § 
E4.5a (2003), available at http://www.immigration.govt.nz/nzis/operations 
_manual/6161.htm, and NEW ZEALAND IMMIGRATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS MANUAL 
§ E4.5a (2005), available at http://www.immigration.govt.nz/nzis/operations 
manual/990.htm#o7611. 
 76. Hazeldean & Betz, supra note 4, at 18. 
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family unity.77  In adopting the UAFA, Congress will be 
strengthening the right to family and family unity for gay and 
lesbian U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents as well as their 
children. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN 
LAWRENCE SUPPORT EXTENDING IMMIGRATION BENEFITS TO  SAME-
SEX COUPLES 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence relied heavily upon 
international norms to strike down a Texas state anti-sodomy law.  
In so doing, the Court affirmed the right to form and sustain loving 
personal relationships, regardless of the partners’ genders, and to 
lead private lives free of government restriction and legal 
condemnation.  Current immigration law acts to restrict the right 
of bi-national same-sex couples to sustain loving personal 
relationships.  Many bi-national same-sex couples are forced by law 
to separate because the U.S. citizen or lawful resident cannot 
sponsor his or her foreign-national partner for immigration 
benefits.  Such reality is contrary to the internationally recognized 
right to family and family unity as well as the liberty right 
recognized by Lawrence.  In adopting non-discriminatory 
immigration legislation and policy, eighteen countries have 
recognized the importance of family unity to same-sex couples.  By 
passing the UAFA, Congress will further comply with its obligations 
under international law to protect the right to family and family 
unity.  Moreover, Congress will further the liberty interest of same-
sex couples, recognized by Lawrence, to form and sustain loving 
personal relationships without the governmental intrusion of 
forced separation. 
A. The International Right to Family and Family Unity and Its 
Application to Immigration Law and Policy 
There is broad international consensus on the importance of 
the family.  International human rights law protects the right to 
family life.  As one court has noted, “[t]he essence of family life is 
the right to live together.”78  Moreover, a variety of different treaty 
provisions suggest that current international law contains norms 
 
 77. See infra Part IV. 
 78. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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against involuntary family separation.79  The protection of the 
international right to family life and unity is of particular relevance 
to foreign nationals, both in matters of entry and deportation, as 
well as in the conditions of residence.  Immigration equality is 
necessary to protect the families and family unity of same-sex 
couples. 
1. International Law Mandates that the United States Protect the 
Right to Family Life and Family Unity 
International treaty law renders a duty upon State Parties to 
uphold the provisions set forth within a given treaty instrument.80  
States become Party to an international treaty upon signature and 
ratification of the instrument.  Upon such ratification, State Parties 
are obliged to implement national legislation consistent with the 
duties and obligations to which the treaty alludes.  The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”); the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; and three regional human 
rights conventions for Europe, the Americas, and Africa entered 
into force in 1953, 1978, and 1986, respectively, all contain specific 
provisions affecting families and have implications for the 
development of an international norm against involuntary family 
separation. 
The international right to family integrity is an aspect of the 
right to privacy, which is protected by a number of international 
conventions.  Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference 
with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks 
upon his honour and reputation.  Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”81  
Similar language focusing on a standard of arbitrariness is found in 
Article 17 of the ICCPR,82 Article 11 of the American Convention 
 
 79. See infra text accompanying notes 88-97. 
 80. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is 
part of our law . . . .”). 
 81. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 12, G.A. Res. 217(A)(III), 
U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 82. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
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on Human Rights (“American Convention”),83 Article 16 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child,84 and Article 10 of the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.85  Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (“European 
Convention”) provides similar protection in that “[e]veryone has 
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.”86  Instead of using the term “arbitrary,” the 
European Convention spells out the conditions under which the 
State may interfere with family life: 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with 
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.87 
Various treaty provisions also “seek to protect the family unit, 
as opposed to the rights of individuals to remain with their families.  
These provisions focus on the family as an institution and its 
relationship to society as a whole.”88  For instance, Article 16(3) of 
the Universal Declaration states: “The family is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the State.”89  Article 23(1) of the ICCPR90 and Article 
17(1) of the American Convention91 contain identical language to 
that contained within the Universal Declaration.  “Implicit in this 
right is the right of family members to live together,” according to 
 
 83. American Convention on Human Rights art. 11, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978). 
 84. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 16, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 
1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 85. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 11, 1990, 
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999). 
 86. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Council of Europe, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230. 
 87. Id. art. 8(2); see also Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a 
Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 220 (2003) (listing 
treaties that address the subject and noting, “arbitrariness is the touchstone for 
what counts as unlawful interference with the family”). 
 88. Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 87, at 228. 
 89. UDHR, supra note 81, art. 16(3), at 71. 
 90. ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 23(1). 
 91. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 83, art. 17(1). 
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one American court’s interpretation of the ICCPR.92  To protect the 
fundamental right of families to live together, the ICCPR provides 
that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his . . . family . . . .”93  The Preamble to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child similarly describes the family as the 
“fundamental group of society.”94  Protections for family life are 
also espoused in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).95  Article 18 of the African Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights goes into further detail regarding 
the family’s cultural role and the State’s obligations: 
1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. 
It shall be protected by the State which shall take care of 
its physical health and morals. 
2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is 
the custodian of morals and traditional values recognized 
by the community.96 
These treaties explicitly promote and protect the rights to family 
life and family unity.  The United States, being a State Party to the 
ICCPR and the American Convention, has a duty under 
international treaty law to implement national legislation consistent 
with the duties and obligations alluded to within these instruments, 
including the right to family and family unity.97 
 
 92. Taveras-Lopez v. Reno, 127 F. Supp. 2d 598, 608 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (citing 
ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 23(1)). 
 93. ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 17(1). 
 94. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 84. 
 95. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened 
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 10(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 
1976) (“The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the 
family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for 
its establishment and [because] it is responsible for the care and education of 
dependent children.”). 
 96. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights art. 18(1), (2), June 27, 
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1986). 
 97. “[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations, if any other possible construction remains . . . .” Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876, 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 
U.S. 64, 67 (1804), quoted in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953)); see also, 
e.g., RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 
PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 159, 160, 272 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the 
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988), which gives district courts original 
jurisdiction of actions by aliens for torts “committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States”); cf. Judicial Conference, Second Circuit, 
170 F.R.D. 201, 312-18 (1997) (public debate by members of the Court of Appeals, 
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Furthermore, as a member of the United Nations, the United 
States has a duty to respect the principles set forth in the United 
Nations Charter.  The U.N. Charter is a treaty which binds member 
states of the United Nations.98  The U.N. Charter reads, in relevant 
part, that the purpose of the United Nations is to promote and 
encourage respect for human rights.99  While the U.N. Charter fails 
to define what human rights are, such rights may be defined by 
reference to the various human rights conventions subsequently 
adopted by the United Nations, known as the International Bill of 
Human Rights.100  The Universal Declaration and the ICCPR, 
instruments included within the International Bill of Human 
Rights, recognize the international right to family.  The rights 
contained within the International Bill of Human Rights are 
incorporated into the larger definition of human rights under the 
U.N. Charter that should be adhered to by the United States. 
Lastly, the United States may have a duty under customary 
international law to protect and preserve the right to family and 
family unity as recognized by the Universal Declaration and ICCPR.  
Customary international law, which is comprised of the customs 
and usages among nations of the world, is part of the law of the 
United States.101  The United States applies the international 
customary law of human rights, which is part of the greater body of 
law.102  Treaty law can be evidence of customary international law in 
 
Second Circuit on the effect of treaties and human rights law on the internal law 
of the United States). 
 98. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2 (“All Members, in order to ensure to all of 
them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith 
the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.”). 
 99. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. 
 100. The International Bill of Human Rights incorporates the following 
instruments: Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.  Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), the 
International Bill of Human Rights, June 1996, http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
html/menu6/2/fs2.htm. 
 101. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731, 735 (2004) (reviewing a 
claim that the principles of a treaty not enforceable in federal courts had “attained 
the status of binding customary international law”); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 
677, 700 (1900). 
 102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 701 cmt. e (1987). 
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that treaties tend to reflect customary norms.103  When a treaty 
codifies customary international law, the provisions that originated 
as customary law remain binding on all states, while any new 
provisions bind only the states that ratify the treaty.104  The 
provisions within the ICCPR and Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights reflect customary international law.105  As such, the rights to 
be free from arbitrary interference with family life and from 
arbitrary expulsion are human rights that are part of customary 
international law that the United States must respect. 
2. The Application of the International Right to Family Life and 
Family Unity to Countries’ Immigration Laws and Policy 
Some of the most frequent instances of family separation 
occur in the context of immigration and anti-immigration 
policies.106  Traditionally, international law has recognized a 
sovereign right by states to exclude and deport aliens under its 
domestic immigration laws.107  This right, however, is limited by 
countervailing provisions of international law, including the right 
that deportees be provided with various procedural protections, 
have individualized deportation proceedings, and not be removed 
if they can demonstrate eligibility for asylum or refugee status.108 
“No specific human rights treaty provision bans separation of 
families through deportation.”109  The deportation of foreign 
nationals may nevertheless violate various human rights treaties, 
specifically the treaty provisions which recognize the international 
right to family and family unity.  For example, the U.N. Human 
 
 103. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 345 
(1991); Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge 
of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 211, 222 (1991). 
 104. Gunning, supra note 103, at 213. 
 105. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217(III)(A) 
(Dec. 10, 1948), as a source of customary international law). 
 106. See Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 87, at 213.  Other instances include wars 
and refugee crises, intra-cultural conflicts, and “changing conceptions of what 
constitutes a family.”  Id. at 278, 287. 
 107. See id. at 266. 
 108. Id.; see also Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 233-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), 
abrogated on other grounds by Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2004); Louis 
Henkin, Evolving Concepts of International Human Rights Law and the Current 
Consensus, Speech before the Judicial Conference for the Second Circuit (June 
15, 1996) in 170 F.R.D. 201, 275-76 (1997). 
 109. See Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 87, at 262. 
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Rights Committee has recognized that deportation can interfere 
with family life in violation of Article 23(1) of the ICCPR.110  The 
ICCPR prevents a nation from separating families in a manner that, 
while in accordance with national law, is nonetheless unreasonable 
and in conflict with the treaty provisions which specify that 
interference with family shall be “unlawful” and shall not be 
“arbitrary.”111  Similarly, the European Human Rights Committee 
considered the application of the right to family and the rights of 
aliens.  It noted that although the ICCPR does not recognize a 
right of an alien to enter or to reside in a particular state, “in 
certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the 
Covenant even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when 
considerations of nondiscrimination, prohibition of inhuman 
treatment and respect for family life arise.”112  In accord with this 
statement, the Committee also noted the following in its comment 
on article 23: 
[T]he right to found a family implies, in principle, the 
possibility to procreate and live together . . . [and this] 
implies the adoption of appropriate measures, both at the 
internal level and as the case may be, in cooperation with 
other States, to ensure the unity or reunification of 
families, particularly when their members are separated 
for political, economic or similar reasons.113 
The Committee considered the application of ICCPR article 
 
 110. Taveras-Lopez v. Reno, 127 F. Supp. 2d 598, 608 (M.D. Pa. 2000); see also 
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex 13, 
at 134, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (Apr. 9, 1981), reprinted in 2 HUM. RTS. L.J. 139 (The 
findings and recommendations of the U.N. Human Rights Committee are not 
binding upon the U.S.  Article 19(6) of the Convention on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights requires states to “facilitate as far as possible the reunion of the 
family of a foreign worker” who has legally migrated, while the 1977 European 
Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers provides similar protections 
for migrant workers’ families.); Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 87, at 219-20. 
 111. Taveras-Lopez, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 608. 
 112. Elizabeth Landry, Note & Comment, States As International Law-Breakers: 
Discrimination Against Immigrants and Welfare Reform, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1108-09 
(1996); see also International Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies 18, P 5 (1992) [hereinafter HRI/GEN]. Drawing from its experience in 
reviewing state reports submitted under article 40 of the Covenant, the Human 
Rights Committee intends its comments to assist state parties in implementing 
their Covenant obligations.  Id. 
 113. Landry, supra note 112, at 1109; see also HRI/GEN, supra note 112, at 28-
29, P 5. 
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17 to a state’s immigration laws that prevented women from 
bringing their alien husbands into the country.  It held: 
[T]he exclusion of a person from a country where close 
members of his family are living can amount to an 
interference within the meaning of Article 17 . . . . 
[Whether the immigration laws are] compatible with the 
Covenant depends on whether such interference is either 
“arbitrary or unlawful” as stated in Article 17(1), or 
conflicts in any other way with the State party’s obligations 
under the Covenant.114  
The Committee went on to find that “‘[i]n the present cases, 
not only the future possibility of deportation but the existing 
precarious residence situation of foreign husbands in Mauritius 
represents . . . an interference . . . with the family life of the 
Mauritian wives and their husbands.’”115 
In interpreting the content of Article 8 of the European 
Convention “respect for family life” with regard to aliens’ entry and 
expulsion from European states, the European Court of Human 
Rights has consistently held that an illegal immigrant’s interest in 
family unity outweighs a State’s interest in enforcing its 
immigration laws and protecting the “public order.”116  In its 
decisions, the court recognized that no alien has a right to enter or 
reside in a particular country or a right not to be expelled.  It 
further recognized that the expulsion or refusal of entry of persons 
 
 114. Landry, supra note 112, at 1109; see also Report of the Human Rights 
Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5(4) of the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Concerning Communication No. R. 9/35, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 
134, P 9.2(b)(2)(i)(2) U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) [hereinafter HRC Report]. 
 115. See Landry, supra note 112, at 1109; HRC Report, supra note 114. 
 116. Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 87, at 221; see Landry, supra note 112, at 
1110-11; see also, e.g., Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 147-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); 
Lamguindaz v. The United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 213, 215-16 (1993) (Court 
report); Moustaquim v. Belgium, Eur. H.R. Rep. 802, 815 (1991) (Court report); 
Djeroud v. France, App. 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 68, 79 (1991) (Court report); Berrehab 
v. The Netherlands, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322, 331 (1988) (Court report); Abdulaziz 
v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471, 494-95 (1985) (Court report). 
Lamguindaz and Djeroud reached friendly settlement with the state party so 
references are to the decisions of the European Commission on Human Rights.  
Although certainly not binding on the United States, decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights are an invaluable source of international human rights 
jurisprudence.  The European Court is especially significant because it has been 
interpreting fundamental human rights norms under the European Convention 
for nearly forty years. 
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from or to a country in which their immediate family is resident 
may violate article 8 of the European Convention.117  “The right to 
cohabitate with one’s family has been held to be a central aspect of 
‘family life’ under Article 8 (as well as a core element of the Article 
12 right to ‘found a family’)” of the European Convention.118 
European courts have even recognized the right to family unity 
for same-sex couples.  A Finnish court “found a violation of article 
8 [of the European Convention] in the attempted expulsion of a 
Russian homosexual who was in the country illegally.”119  “Noting 
his domestic partnership with a Finn, the court deemed the 
proposed expulsion an interference with the couple’s ‘private life’ 
and, hence, prohibited by article 8.”120  Similarly, where 
immigration “authorities had failed to weigh the interests [of a 
foreign national, married to an Austrian,] in maintaining his family 
life against the general interests of the community in public safety, 
the [Constitutional Court of Austria] invalidated the visa-denial 
under article 8.”121 
In contrast to European tribunals, U.S. courts have 
traditionally been reluctant to incorporate international norms 
into their interpretation of domestic laws.122  Many courts, however, 
 
 117. See Lamguindaz, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 215-16; Landry, supra note 112, at 
1111.  Interestingly, the European Court’s position that forced separation may 
violate the respect for family life did not change when it considered the attempted 
expulsion of a long-time resident “criminal” alien or alien divorced from a 
national with whom he had a child.  See, e.g., Lamguindaz, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 215-
16; Moustaquim, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 815; Djeroud, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 79; Berrehab, 
11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 331;  see also Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 147-48. 
 118. Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 87 at 220; see Abdulaziz, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 
10, P 10. 
 119. See X v. Finland, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 499 (Sup. Admin. Ct.); 
Landry, supra note 112, at 1112. The other part of the decision rested on the fact 
that, as a homosexual, he might face inhuman or degrading treatment if he were 
returned to Russia. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See, X v. Austria, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 487-88 (Const. Ct.); 
Landry, supra note 112, at 1113. 
 122. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (recalling that the Court 
has held that an “[a]ct of Congress . . . is on a full parity with a treaty, and that 
when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute, 
to the extent of conflict, renders the treaty null”); Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 
310, 316 (1914) (“[I]t is well settled that when a treaty is inconsistent with a 
subsequent act of Congress, the latter will prevail.”).  A principle of customary 
international law does not preempt a contrary enactment of Congress.  See 
Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[I]n enacting statutes, Congress is 
not bound by international law.  If it chooses to do so, it may legislate [contrary 
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are now considering international law when deciding domestic 
cases.123  Moreover, a few federal courts have considered the 
international right to family and family unity when adjudicating 
immigration law.124  The Lawrence Court’s reliance on international 
 
to] the limits posed by international law.”) (citation omitted); In re Cuban, 822 F. 
Supp. 192, 197-98 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (“Congress in enacting legislative law, is not 
bound by international law.”).  Thus, “no enactment of Congress can be 
challenged on the ground that it violates customary international law.”  Comm. of 
U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  
Finally, according to the Restatement of Foreign Relations, “[a]n Act of Congress 
supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an international 
agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the 
earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision 
cannot be fairly reconciled.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §115(1)(a) (1987). 
 123. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, International Human Rights and United States Law: 
Predictions of a Courtwatcher, 64 ALB. L. REV. 417, 420 (2000).  In Cabrera-Alvarez v. 
Gonzales, the petitioner sought “cancellation of removal in order to prevent 
hardship to his two young children, who are United States citizens.”  423 F.3d 
1006, 1007 (9th Cir. 2005).  He argued that the immigration judge, in denying 
him cancellation of removal, interpreted the “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” standard, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2000), in a manner inconsistent 
with international law, specifically Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, which states that “[i]n all actions concerning children 
. . . the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”  Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, supra note 84, art. 3(1).  The court denied the petition.  
In doing so, it recognized “the presumption that Congress intends to legislate in a 
manner consistent with international law is a recognized canon of statutory 
construction.”  Cabrera-Alvarez, 423 F.3d at 1009.  However, it held that because 
“Congress has the power to ‘legislate beyond the limits posed by international law,’ 
in some cases a statute’s text will not be susceptible to an interpretation consistent 
with international law.”  Id.  Thus, “an act of Congress should be construed so as 
not to conflict with international law where it is possible to do so without 
distorting the statute.  The statute at issue here limits cancellation of removal to 
those who can demonstrate that removal would result in exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the 
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”  Id. at 1009-
10 (emphasis in original).  It is noteworthy that the United States has not ratified 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Id.  Therefore, the court found “the 
Convention is not ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ under the Treaty Clause of the 
United States Constitution.”  Id. at 1010.  In evaluating the petitioner’s claim, the 
court did assume that the Convention had attained the status of “customary 
international law.”  Id.  From that point, the analysis rested on the best interests of 
the child, rather than the right to family unity.  Id. at 1011. 
 124. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d, 329 F.3d 
51 (2d Cir. 2003); Taveras-Lopez v. Reno, 127 F. Supp. 2d 598 (M.D. Pa. 2000) 
(holding that Article 23(1) of the ICCPR does not mandate that petitioner, 
convicted of aggravated felony, be accorded the opportunity to seek cancellation 
of removal); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), overruled by 
Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that customary 
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norms invites application of these norms to other areas of the law, 
including immigration.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has already 
held that family unity is a fundamental right protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.125 
 
B. The Legal and Equitable Implications of Lawrence and Its 
Application to Immigration Equality in the United States 
 
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court recognized the existence of and 
affirmed the value of same-sex relationships.  In addition, although 
the Lawrence Court did not treat international consensus as 
determinative, it found the international community strongly 
supported and confirmed the correctness of its decision to 
overturn Bowers.126  In light of the legal changes described in the 
preceding section, there is strong evidence of similar international 
support for providing legal recognition to same-sex couples for the 
purposes of immigration. 
In Lawrence v. Texas, petitioners Lawrence and Garner 
challenged the Texas “Homosexual Conduct” law, which 
criminalized certain types of sexual intimacy in same-sex couples, 
but not in different-sex couples.127  The Court overruled Bowers v. 
Hardwick,128 in which it had found that a Georgia law criminalizing 
sodomy was constitutional.129  The Court overruled Bowers for 
 
international law prohibited arbitrary expulsion and interference with family life). 
 125. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (plurality opinion); 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“The integrity of the family unit has 
found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 126. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986)).  The Court again established its willingness to look to law in other 
countries to support its position in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 
(2005).  In that case, the Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court’s holding in 
State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), finding the execution 
of minors unconstitutional.  The Court based its decision on its interpretation of 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  However, it found its decision was 
confirmed by “the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the 
world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”  125 S. 
Ct. at 1198.  It also acknowledged “the overwhelming weight of international 
opinion against the juvenile death penalty.”  Id. at 1200.  This was reflected in the 
laws of other countries which had outlawed or disapproved of application of the 
death penalty to juveniles, but also in international treaties including the ICCPR, 
the American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, and the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.  Id. at 1199. 
 127. 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003). 
 128. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 129. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
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several reasons, including the growing international awareness that 
adults should have liberty in choosing partners for consensual 
intimate relationships.130 
The Court’s criticism of Bowers has four components.  First, the 
Bowers Court “misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented 
to it” by underestimating the “far-reaching consequences” of 
sodomy statutes and framing the issue merely as whether there was 
a “fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy.”131 
Second, the Bowers Court relied in its ruling on a definitive 
version of history now criticized and rejected by the Lawrence 
Court.132  Specifically, the Lawrence Court rejected the idea that 
sodomy laws reflected a tradition in the U.S. of systematic 
punishment of homosexual acts, noting that they were instead 
consistent with “ensur[ing] . . . coverage if a predator committed a 
sexual assault that did not constitute rape as defined by the 
criminal law” and “a general condemnation of nonprocreative 
sex.”133 
Third, the Bowers Court ignored the general trend towards 
permissiveness towards same-sex relations and “an emerging 
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons 
in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining 
to sex.”134  The Court noted that this trend was apparent in the fact 
that sodomy laws were rarely enforced by the States that had them, 
and that authorities in Britain and the European Court of Human 
Rights had found in favor of legalizing consensual homosexual 
conduct.135 
Finally, two Supreme Court cases decided after Bowers 
undermined its holding—Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey136 and Romer v. Evans.137  Casey was a due 
process case in which the Court reaffirmed that “laws and tradition 
afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education.”138  The Court reasoned that Casey’s 
 
 130. Id. at 572-73. 
 131. Id. at 567. 
 132. Id. at 568. 
 133. Id. at 569-70. 
 134. Id. at 572. 
 135. Id. at 572-73. 
 136. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 137. 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74. 
 138. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74 (interpreting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (joint 
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guarantee of autonomy extends to those in a homosexual 
relationship, who must be allowed to make “the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central 
to personal dignity and autonomy . . . central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”139 
Romer was an equal protection case in which the Court held 
unconstitutional a law that was “born of animosity”140 towards 
homosexuals and that “had no rational relation to a legitimate 
governmental purpose.”141  The Court declined to use Romer alone 
to base the Lawrence decision on the Equal Protection Clause, 
however, recognizing that such a decision would leave uncertain 
the constitutionality of sodomy laws drawn to prohibit the conduct 
between same-sex and different-sex partners.142 
The Lawrence Court noted that because Romer and Casey had 
weakened the precedent set by Bowers, criticism from other sources 
takes on greater significance.143  These “other sources” include legal 
scholars and foreign courts and legislatures, many of which have 
recognized a right for homosexual adults to engage in “intimate, 
consensual conduct.”144  The Lawrence Court looked outside the 
borders of the United States and relied heavily on other tribunals’ 
analyses in examining the issue of anti-sodomy laws.  Justice 
Kennedy’s decision noted the developments in England and under 
the European Convention on Human Rights to make the point that 
there is an international view that anti-sodomy laws violate basic 
human rights.145  Moreover, the Court noted that this trend was 
apparent in the fact that sodomy laws were rarely enforced by the 
states that had them and that authorities in Britain and the 
European Court of Human Rights had found in favor of legalizing 
consensual homosexual conduct.146  The Lawrence Court also noted 
that many authorities at the time of Bowers, including a committee 
advising the British Parliament in 1957 and the European Court of 
Human Rights, recommended the decriminalization of sodomy.147 
 
opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)). 
 139. Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (emphasis added)). 
 140. Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 575. 
 143. Id. at 576. 
 144. Id. at 576-77. 
 145. Id. at 572-73. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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Further, the Lawrence Court imported the concept of Article 8 
of the European Convention (right to respect for private life) into 
its interpretation of the boundaries of “liberty” protected by the 
Due Process Clause.  The court held: “The petitioners are entitled 
to respect for their private lives.  The State cannot demean their 
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual 
conduct a crime.”148 
The Lawrence Court made clear that in overruling Bowers it was 
doing more than decriminalizing an act—it was affirming the right 
of gay people to form and sustain loving personal relationships and 
to lead their private lives free of government restriction and legal 
condemnation.  The Court declared that gay couples “are entitled 
to respect for their private lives.”149  It recognized that sodomy 
prohibitions wrongly “seek to control a personal relationship 
that . . . is within the liberty of persons to choose,” in which 
intimate sexuality may be “but one element in a personal bond that 
is more enduring.”150  Likewise, in her concurrence, Justice 
O’Connor observed that sodomy laws had been abused to deny gay 
people rights in the very context before this Court: “the law ‘legally 
sanctions discrimination against [homosexuals]’ . . . in the area[ 
] . . . ‘of family issues . . . .’”151  Justice O’Connor noted that the 
Constitution is most skeptical of state action that “inhibits personal 
relationships.”152 
Crucial to understanding the decision in Lawrence is the 
recognition that same-sex relationships deserve the same liberty 
rights as other family units.  The Lawrence Court explicitly stated 
that its ruling was silent on whether a same-sex relationship was 
entitled to formal recognition in the law.153 Its reasoning, however, 
implies that such recognition might be appropriate where its 
absence is so damaging as to actively infringe on the liberty of 
“homosexual persons” to choose how and with whom they create a 
 
 148. Id. at 578.  Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
provides a right to respect for one’s “private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence,” subject to certain restrictions that are “in accordance with law” 
and “necessary in a democratic society.”  Landry, supra note 112, at 1110; see also 
Arthur S. Leonard, The Impact of International Human Rights Developments on Sexual 
Minority Rights, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 525 (2004). 
 149. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 150. Id. at 567. 
 151. Id. at 582.  (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 152. Id. at 580. 
 153. Id. at 578. 
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“personal bond” (i.e., romantic relationship).154  Just as intimate 
sexual conduct is an important, if not an integral, part of an 
intimate relationship, so too is geographical proximity.  Denying a 
couple the ability to live in the same country can be as devastating 
as criminalizing their sexual conduct.  Partners unable to reside 
together are forced to separate, relocate to another country, 
and/or maintain expensive and emotionally challenging long 
distance relationships.  Immigration equality provides for the 
liberty interest of a committed couple’s desire to live together as a 
family unit. 
The U.S. government has historically taken the position that 
family unity is a worthwhile policy objective for immigration law 
and that forced separation of family members may be a hardship.155  
In an attempt to promote family unity, Congress eliminated 
numerical restrictions upon immediate family members of U.S. 
citizens to immigrate to the United States.156  Similarly, Congress 
created ranking preferences for family-sponsored visas, granting 
preference in this order: unmarried sons and daughters of citizens; 
spouses and children, and unmarried sons and daughters of 
permanent residents; married sons and daughters of citizens; 
brothers and sisters of adult citizens.157  A Select Commission 
appointed by Congress to study U.S. immigration policy recognized 
 
 154. Id. at 567.  This Article is not the place to argue about the 
constitutionality of denying marriage to same-sex couples.  While, like Laurence 
Tribe, the authors do not wish to “join the veritable cottage industry . . . 
developing out of the unremarkable observation that Lawrence might in the end 
prove to be [a] halting and limited . . . step forward,” they do want to forestall the 
“slippery slope” fears that have proven such a sticking point in meeting the urgent 
need for legislation sensitive to the realities of same-sex bi-national couples.  
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak 
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1950 (2004).  It is thus worth noting that the 
denial of some rights, such as the ability to stay together in the same country, 
impacts couples in a qualitatively different way from others, such as the ability to 
file taxes jointly. 
 155. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2000) (allowing cancellation of removal 
for some cases where there is “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the 
alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence”); H.R. 440, 108th Cong. (2003) (“To 
amend the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . to promote family unity.”). 
 156. H.R. 440, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 157. See Marshall L. Cohen, Obtaining Permanent Resident Status Through Family 
Relationships, in IMMIGRATION LAW: ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 61, 63 
(Study Course No. 38, 1998); cf. Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to 
Family Unity: Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of 
Plenary Power Versus Aliens’ Rights, 41 VILL. L. REV. 725, 729 (1996). 
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the family reunification goal in its recommendations, finding that 
reunification of families serves the national interest not only 
through the humaneness of the policy itself, but also through the 
promotion of the public order and well-being of the nation.158  The 
Commission went on to find that, psychologically and socially, the 
reunion of family members with their close relatives promotes the 
health and welfare of the United States.159  Later, in debating the 
Immigration Act of 1990, several members of Congress voiced their 
support for strengthening the family reunification provisions of the 
immigration laws.  Representative Bonior supported strengthening 
the family unity policies: “The wait for family reunification can be 
long and painful . . . . Not only is it antifamily to allow such long 
separations, it is also counterproductive. For it only encourages 
illegal immigration as the best way to become united with loved 
ones.”160  Representative McGraph stated that “[f]amily unification 
is the cornerstone of immigration to the United States.  Prolonging 
the separation of spouses from each other . . . is inconsistent with 
the principles on which this nation was founded.”161 
Congress should recognize the principles espoused in Lawrence 
as further support to enact legislation providing for immigration 
equality.  As illustrated by the reasoning in Lawrence, it is a very 
small step from finding sodomy statutes unconstitutional to 
recognizing that same-sex partners must have the same rights to 
immigration as opposite-sex married couples.  Adoption of the 
UAFA would strengthen the privacy rights of same-sex couples to 
form and sustain loving personal relationships without 
governmental interference, specifically in the form of separation by 
exclusion or deportation.  Such legislation would also promote U.S. 
policy that recognizes the importance of family unity.  Just as the 
U.S. Supreme Court relied upon foreign tribunals’ analyses in 
examining the constitutionality of anti-sodomy laws, Congress 
should adopt the practice and policy of eighteen countries’ 
immigration laws that allow gay citizens and residents to sponsor 
their same-sex partners for immigration benefits. 
 
 158. See U.S. SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGR. & REFUGEE POL’Y, U.S. IMMIGRATION 
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 112 (1981). 
 159. Id. 
 160. 136 CONG. REC. H8629 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. 
Bonior). 
 161. Id. at H8631 (statement of Rep. McGrath). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Constitution guarantees gay people the right to choose 
how and with whom to create a “personal bond,” to form and 
sustain loving personal relationships, and to lead their private lives 
free of government restriction and legal condemnation.  Countless 
bi-national same-sex couples are faced with the painful reality of 
serious challenges to their family unification, including forced 
separation.  Adoption of the UAFA would give effect to the 
government’s policy of “family unity,” remedy the unequal 
treatment of same-sex partners under U.S. immigration law, align 
the U.S. with its foreign allies’ immigration policies, further the 
equality guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution and reaffirmed by 
Lawrence, and carry out the obligations and duties imposed upon 
the U.S. under its international treaty obligations. 
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